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Should Metaethical Naturalists 
Abandon de dicto Internalism and 
Cognitivism?
A Reply to Yann Wilhelm
Jesse Prinz
Yann Wilhelm pursues three issues in response to my target article. First, he tries
to expose my naturalism as more radical than I let on. I concede the point, though
I also offer ways in which my radicalism might be mitigated. Second, he exposes a
limitation in my argument for internalism, and suggests that naturalists should
defend form on internalism that is neutral about conceptual claims (de re internal-
ism, rather than de dicto). I welcome the suggestion, but also consider how natur-
alists might defend de dicto internalism. Third, Wilhelm challenges my argument
against non-cognitivism, by offering a novel explanation of the fact that moral
judgments have an assertoric form. I response, I note avenues for cognitivist resist-
ance to Wilhelm’s explanation. 
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1 Introduction
In “Naturalizing Metaethics,” I try to establish
that core questions in metaethics lend themselves
to empirical investigation. I argue that we can po-
tentially adjudicate long-standing debates by test-
ing predictions made by competing metaethical
theories. I also make some conjectures about how
such empirical investigations will turn out. Based
on a small selection of preliminary findings, I ad-
vance a case of a version of sentimentalism—the
view that emotions are essential to moral judg-
ments.  I  also suggest that sentimentalism com-
mits  me  to  internalism—the  view  that  moral
judgments are essentially motivating—and I ad-
vance an empirical case for cognitvism—the claim
that moral judgments are, like other assertions,
capable of being true or false.
In his  insightful  commentary,  Yann Wil-
helm offers clarifications and challenges to my
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arguments. First, he asks whether my natural-
ism is compatible with traditional approaches in
philosophy. I imply that the two can co-exist in
a  complementary  way,  but  Wilhelm  suggests
that my naturalism is more radical that it ap-
pears. I am forced to agree, and to clarify the
co-existence claim. Wilhelm also challenges my
case for internalism, distinguishing two different
forms and suggesting I am only in a position to
argue for one of them. I am open to that pos-
sibility, but I also sketch a strategy for defend-
ing both forms. Wilhelm concludes with a chal-
lenge to my defense of cognitivism. He provides
non-cognitivists with an explanation for findings
that I say they cannot explain. I offer a cognit-
ivist response, but grant that this proposal de-
mands empirical attention. 
Wilhelm’s commentary provides a valuable
contribution to empirically oriented metaethics.
He offers strategies for avoiding certain kinds of
debates with opponents of naturalism, and he
identities  empirical  issues  that  can  be  used
settle debates between card-carrying naturalists.
Wilhelm deepens my understanding of these is-
sues  and strengthens  my optimism about  the
prospects of naturalistic metaethics. 
2 Is naturalism a radical position?
Before moving on to the first order debates that
Wilhelm so helpfully pursues, I want to concede
an important point that he makes in the open-
ing of his commentary. Wilhelm rightly observes
that  I  overstate  the  extent  to  which  a  thor-
oughgoing  naturalism  can  preserve  traditional
approaches to philosophy. Though ostensibly a
plea  for  consilience,  I  am,  in  fact,  skeptical
about the notion  a prioricity.  Rather, I claim
that armchair methods are observational (intu-
itions are defeasible inner observations informed
by prior experience, and open to empirical cor-
rection). As Wilhelm makes clear, traditionalists
who view conceptual analysis as an a priori en-
deavor will not share my enthusiasm for natur-
alism. 
In another respect, however, my position is
conservative.  I  don’t  think  traditional  philo-
sophers must stop working as they currently do.
Armchair methods remain the primary source of
philosophical  theories  and  distinctions.  They
also  are  the  primary  source  for  philosophical
thought experiments that can be used to test
between theories. Thus, my invitation to inter-
pret armchair methods as observation is inten-
ded as a vindication of traditional philosophy,
though  not  a  vindication  of  how some tradi-
tional  philosophers  understand  their  own  en-
deavors. 
Proof  of  this  qualified  vindication  comes
form the  fact  that  empirically  oriented  philo-
sophers  regularly  draw on traditional  work in
devising  their  studies.  For  example,  experi-
mental philosophers have used trolley problems,
twin earth cases, and the thought experiments
used to back contextualism in epistemology. In
my target paper, I relied on theories that have
been  identified  and  articulated  within  tradi-
tional philosophy. Testing between theories re-
quires observation, I believe, but it would be a
great loss if every philosopher ran a laboratory.
Instead,  I  envision  a  future for  philosophy in
which  many  researchers  do  no  experimental
work, others are primarily experimentalists, and
still others do a combination of the two. If we
begin  to  make  empirical  methods  a  standard
part of philosophical training, then philosophers
will be able to read psychological research more
responsibly and conduct experiments when they
see fit. But it doesn’t mean that they will also
suddenly stop thinking and blindly collect data.
As in the sciences, theoretical work in required
in philosophy. We can resist the idea of a priori
truth without throwing away the armchair. 
3 Must naturalist be content with de re 
internalism?
These methodological points bear on Wilhelm’s
first challenge to my metaethical conclusions. In
the target paper I argue for a form of internal-
ism  (roughly,  the  view  that  moral  judgments
are essentially motivating). Wilhelm points out
that my evidence for this claim will not satisfy
many externalists. I primarily rely on evidence
that  moral  judgments  always  co-occur  with
emotional states, but fee externalists will be im-
pressed; they will say that such findings cannot
address questions about whether it is necessar-
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ily the case that moral judgments are motivat-
ing, even if they always happen to be are motiv-
ating. 
Wilhelm helpfully replies to this objection
on  my  behalf,  using  Jon  Tresan’s  distinction
between  de  dicto and  de  re internalism.  The
former is a thesis about the concept of moral
judgment  (viz.,  it  is  a  conceptual  truth  that
when that  concept  applies,  motivation  applies
as well). The latter is a claim about moral judg-
ments themselves (viz., moral judgments do in
fact  carry  motivation  force).  Wilhelm concurs
that my evidence can contribute to a defense of
the de re claim. He suggests that I abandon the
case for  de dicto internalism, since naturalists
should not concern themselves with conceptual
claims.
I welcome Wilhelm’s suggestion, and I am
inclined to endorse it. Let me mention, however,
a  strategy  available  to  the  naturalist  whose
heart is set on defending the de dicto claim. Re-
turning to Wilhelm’s discussion of methodology,
let’s imagine that naturalists wage a successful
campaign  against  the  a  priori.  Properly  pur-
sued,  such  a  campaign  might  also  undermine
metaphysical necessity. Metaphysical necessities,
unlike nomological necessities, are alleged to be
true in virtue of conceptual entailments rather
than laws of nature or natural facts. The cri-
tique of a prioricity threatens metaphysical ne-
cessity because it advances the view that truths
about concepts are open to empirical revision.
Let’s suppose that concepts are mental repres-
entations garnered through experience with the
function of classifying things in the world. So
construed, concepts are susceptible to improve-
ment through empirical inquiry. Initial concepts
are  rough and ready pointers  that  we use to
carve up the observational  world,  and revised
concepts are carvings that remain after observa-
tion.  Now let  us  define  a  “robust  conceptual
truth” as the conceptual entailments that sur-
vive after a concept has been subjected to em-
pirical fine-tuning. Such truths would more or
less  coincide  with  how the  world  is,  together
with certain pragmatic assumptions that go into
theory construction. Thus, they would coincide
with truths that emerge from our study of the
things  themselves  (which  are  also  constrained
by pragmatic assumptions). On this picture, de
dicto collapses into de re. A defense of de re in-
ternalism  would  indicate  that  our  concept  of
moral judgment will converge on internalism as
well. Rather than bypassing  de re internalism,
we can try to defend it by naturalizing concep-
tual truth.
Wilhelm might reply that this defense of
de dicto internalism would not  persuade non-
naturalists. The defense is based on the assump-
tion that the naturalist critique  of a prioricity
goes through, but that is just what non-natural-
ists are inclined to deny. Thus, it might appear
the that the debate over the de dicto position is
hostage  to  unresolvable  disputes  about  the
nature of philosophy.
Here I’d balk at the claim that such dis-
putes are unresolvable.  Those who believe is  a
prioricity may dislike naturalism, but they cer-
tainly believe that their views require evidential
support. Naturalists offer an account of what con-
cepts are (mental representations) and an explan-
ation  of  conceptual  intuitions  (introspection  of
mental representations).  Non-naturalists are ob-
liged to provide an alternative account of both,
and the two accounts can then be compared by
agreed upon standards. I venture that the natur-
alist  account  will  find  a  resounding  victory  in
such a head-to-head match. It is more parsimoni-
ous view, since both sides must grant the exist-
ence of mental representations, and I suspect it
can fully account for our conceptual intuitions. 
These are, of course, big debates, which I
cannot settle here. My point is simply that we
can  imagine  a  two-stage  process  that  begins
with broad issues about naturalism, and then
moves on to first-order views. On my prognosis,
we won’t end up abandoning the notion of con-
ceptual truth, but rather revising it. If so,  de
dicto naturalism might turn out true. Wilhelm
may be right, however, that until we come to
greater consensus on the nature of philosophy,
naturalists might be on firmer ground if  they
try to bypass conceptual questions. He is also
right that, from a naturalist perspective  de re
internalism may be the more interesting thesis.
Conceptual claims lose their distinctive interest
if concepts are revisable and, ultimately, coin-
cident with empirical theories.
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4 Can non-cognitivists explain the 
assertoric form of moral judgments?
Let me turn, finally, to Wilhelm’s constructive
effort to defend non-cognitivism. Non-cognitiv-
ists claim that moral judgments are not like or-
dinary  assertions;  they  cannot  be  assessed  as
true  or  false,  but  rather  merely  express  the
speakers attitudes and commendations. If so, I
ask, why do we express moral judgments as as-
sertions? This is a familiar challenge. In my dis-
cussion, I merely I point out that can be backed
up by empirical data. Wilhelm has a two-part
reply. First, he observes that, for non-cognitiv-
ists, the primary function of moral discourse is
to persuade. C. L. Stevenson, for example, says
that “x is bad” does not just mean “boo to x!”;
it  also  means  and  “say  boo  to  x  as  well!”.
Second, Wilhelm makes the original and plaus-
ible suggestion that this persuasive function is
most effective when it covert. People, he notes,
don’t like to be manipulated. If I explicitly ex-
hort you to say “boo!” you may resist, because
no one likes  being  told what to do.  But if  I
present my attitude in the form on an assertion,
you  might  causally  take  it  on  board,  as  you
would if  I  were  presenting an  ordinary state-
ment of fact.
I think Wilhelm’s proposal deserves seri-
ous  exploration.  Cognitivists  can  respond  in
two  ways.  First,  they  can  try  to  show  that
moral discourse often occurs in contexts that
don’t aim at persuasion. This might seem im-
plausible. After all, why should we bother en-
gaging in moral discourse if we don’t intend to
persuade anyone? On closer analysis, however,
it does seem that much of our moral discourse
involves preaching to the choir. In political de-
bates, for example, left wing pundits and right
wing  pundits  engage  in  a  lot  of  moral  dis-
course, but they never seem to persuade each
other.  This  raises  the  intriguing  possibility
that moral judgments are not primarily in the
business of persuasion. An alternative possib-
ility is that we make moral judgments to as-
sert  our  identity,  or  express  solidarity  with
like-minded individuals. Empirical tests might
be designed to compare the persuasion model
and the self-expression model.
Cognitivists might also try to resist Wil-
helm’s conjecture that people do not like to be
manipulated by consulting research on explicit
persuasion. In defense of Wilhelm’s conjecture,
there  is  a  literature  suggesting  that  people
sometimes resist explicit persuasion (e.g., Petty
&  Cacioppo 1979). On the other hand, resist-
ance does not occur in all contexts. Indeed, in a
consumer  product  context,  Reinhard  et  al.
(2006) found that, when a person is regarded as
likeable (or attractive!), they become even more
persuasive when they make their intent to per-
suade  explicit.  Similarly,  in  studies  of  college
drinking behavior, Neighbors et al. (2008) found
that  injunctive  norms  (which  explicitly  refer-
ence  attitudes)  are  effective  when  and  only
when they are expressed by members of the stu-
dents’  social  groups.  Further  work  could  test
the effects of explicit injunctions in the moral
domain.
I should underscore that I think more test-
ing is required to settle these debates. Wilhem’s
explanation for surface discourse remains viable,
and we can make progress on these issues by de-
vising new ways to test it. These are manifestly
empirical issues. While I wager with the cognit-
ivists, I grant that the case is far from closed.
5 Conclusion
I am indebted to Yann Wilhelm for his generous
and probing commentary. It brings welcome cla-
rification and new challenges to the project I set
out  “Naturalizing  Metaethics.”  I  also  welcome
the spirit of Wilhelm’s discussion, which moves
beyond  ideological  debates  about  metaphilo-
sophy,  and  offers  promising  strategies  for  an-
swering core metaethical questions. 
Wilhelm successfully  establishes  that  my
preferred form of naturalism is less compatible
with traditional philosophy than I let on, but I
also  pointed  out  that  work  by  traditionally
minded philosophy remains an invaluable font
of philosophical theories. Wilhelm then offers a
helpful suggestion that naturalists might more
easily defend internalism if they bypass concep-
tual versions of that view. In response, I sugges-
ted that the radical implications of naturalism
may actually offer a way to defend the concep-
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tual version of internalism, by advancing a nat-
uralized  account  of  conceptual  truth.  Finally,
Wilhelm offered a new psychological cum func-
tional account of moral discourse, which inocu-
lates  non-cognitivists  against  grammatical  ob-
jections. While I hold out hope for cognitivism,
Wilhelm has identified a genuine empirical chal-
lenge to the cognitivist. This challenge beauti-
fully demonstrates the value of empirical testing
in metaethics, and it also reminds us that there
is much work to be done.
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